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 The conceptual framework for the human capital approach to investment in education 
was developed mainly with reference to full employment economies. When we turn to the 
assessment of educational problems in less developed countries, we often encounter a situation 
of surplus labour. 
 In the sense used by Fei and Ranis,1 there is surplus labour when removal of a worker 
leads to no reduction in output; the marginal product of the last worker is zero, and workers are 
paid their average products. However, a situation of surplus labour also exists when there is 
general unemployment throughout an economy, as in India, or in large segments of an economy, 
as in most other less developed countries. Such a situation is die result of institutionally rigid 
wages set, for any number of reasons, above the market-clearing rate. Marginal products are 
positive but unemployment persists. Throughout this discussion, I will use the term ‘surplus 
labour’ in the rigid wage sense. 
 The purpose of this paper is to consider the cost-benefit criterion for resource allocation 
in labour surplus economies calling particular attention to the contrasts with full employment 
economies. The specific plan is as follows. Section 1 reviews the debate over the applicability of 
cost-benefit analysis to problems of investment in education. Section 2 draws two important 
distinctions which are not always clear to educational planners and enumerates the likely 
benefits, both private and social, from education. Section 3 considers the case of full 
employment economies. Section 4 looks at the private returns to education in labour surplus 
economies in relation to the demand for education. Section 5 considers the social costs and 
benefits in labour surplus economies. Section 6 raises the problems of measuring marginal social 
rates of return and demonstrates the inadequacy of wage differentials as a measure of marginal 
social benefit. Section 7 summarizes the main points. 
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1. In Defence of a Cost-Benefit Approach to the Economics of Education 
 
 In order to assess the returns from social projects, economists and other social scientists 
have relied on cost-benefit analysis as the major technique for evaluation and decision-making. 
The cost-benefit criterion may be stated as follows: 
A project is profitable if the marginal social benefits (broadly defined) exceed the 
marginal social costs. The higher the ratio (or difference) between discounted benefits 
and costs, the more worthwhile the project. 
 
 The merits and deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis as a criterion for social decision-
making have been discussed at length in the literature. Perhaps the most comprehensive look at 
the subject is the 1965 survey article by Prest and Turvey.2 As they describe cost-benefit 
analysis: 
Cost-benefit analysis is a practical way of assessing the desirability of projects, where it 
is important to take a long view (in the sense of looking at repercussions in the further, as 
well as the nearer, future) and a wide view (in the sense of allowing for side-effects of 
many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, etc.), i.e., it implies the enumeration 
and evaluation of all the relevant costs and benefits. 
 
 The authors then go on to give an exhaustive list of the main questions which must be 
answered in practical applications of the technique. These questions involve the specification and 
valuation of costs and benefits, choice of interest rate, and relevant constraints. Specific sub-
issues under these headings are discussed in detail. While the problems are many and complex, 
Prest and Turvey conclude that cost-benefit analysis is a very useful technique, although they 
caution the reader that applications to the public-utility areas of government are apt to be more 
fruitful than in the social service areas. 
 Cost-benefit analysis has been applied in many studies evaluating educational and 
training projects.3 In addition to the many practitioners in the area, such leading economists as 
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Arrow,4 Becker,5 Blaug,6 Bowen,7 Bowman,8 Hansen,9 and Weisbrod,10 are among the firm 
believers in the social rate of return to education as a criterion for social investment. However, 
such a view is not unanimously held. Perhaps the strongest objection to the rate of return to 
education concept was raised by Merrett,11 who, after considering the problems of enumerating 
costs and benefits and estimating rates of return by econometric techniques, concluded quite 
simply that ‘research into the rate of return on education should be discontinued’. Balogh and 
Streeten12 scorn the social rate of return to education as the ‘coefficient of ignorance’. Others 
submit that a manpower planning approach is much more fruitful than cost-benefit.13 In general, 
there is little disagreement with the notion of cost-benefit analysis in principle. The contention is 
that the practical problems of the technique are so serious as to render it useless in educational 
research. 
 My own view is that the economist’s main contribution to social decision- making in the 
field of education is to raise explicitly the right questions pertaining to the marginal social costs 
and benefits of an educational endeavour.14 
 The manpower planner who plans supply to match demand asks the wrong questions. He 
asks, ‘What is the absorptive capacity of the economy for persons with different skills and 
educational attainments?’ and does not consider the costs of schooling at all. If employers say (or 
his calculations lead him to believe) that an extra graduate would be hired, the manpower planner 
directs the education system to produce an extra graduate. He does not ask, ‘What is the nature 
of the work the graduate will perform and what benefits will he confer on society?’ Nor does he 
ask, ‘How much will it cost society to educate another graduate? Do the benefits justify the 
costs?’ If educational expansion follows the path recommended by the manpower planner, an 
overproduction of education (in terms of costs and benefits) would be expected. This is because 
Private and Social Returns        5 
the demand for educated persons does not reflect the costs of education. When private firms (and 
government ministries for that matter) report shortages of educated manpower, they are saying in 
effect that it is worthwhile to them to pay a salary and other fringe benefits in exchange for an 
educated man’s services. If they were also required to pay the costs of education, the demand for 
educated labour would surely decrease. Thus, the manpower planner’s goal of equating supply to 
demand would result in an overproduction of education. 
 The problems of evaluating the marginal social costs and benefits of education in labour 
surplus economies are challenging (if not downright discouraging) to advocates of a cost-benefit 
approach. However, economic research has exhibited an encouraging tendency to improve over 
time. As researchers are made more aware of the limitations of the initial efforts of their 
colleagues, as they seek new ways of dealing with conceptual and measurement problems, and as 
new and better data sets become available, more thorough and precise analysis will, hopefully, 
emerge. 
 
2. Two Important Distinctions 
 
 Traditionally, economists have calculated average rates of return to education while 
generally neglecting to point out that they are in fact averages and not marginals. Further, the 
distinction between private and social rates of return seems to be little more than a difference of 
a few percentage points after adjusting for mortality, taxes, and public subsidization of schooling 
costs. Policy recommendations are often proposed on the basis of average returns. To help clarify 
these concepts and to be sure our terminology is consistent, let us review two main distinctions 
which have troubled educational planners. 
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Marginal versus Average 
 
 The average measures the mean outcome of an activity. The marginal measures the 
increment resulting from a change from the existing level. We note that the cost-benefit criterion 
is expressed in terms of marginals, not averages. In some circumstances, the average is a very 
good approximation to the marginal. As we shall see, however, the existence of unemployment 
due to institutional wage rigidities gives us good reason to believe that the marginal and average 
social returns to investment in education in labour surplus economies may diverge sharply. 
 
Private Returns versus Social Returns 
 
 The costs incurred and benefits received by society are not identically equal to the costs 
and benefits to the individual, although they may be of the same general magnitude. The social 
costs of education include the value of the resources used to construct and maintain school 
facilities and to train teachers, the output foregone by employing highly-educated persons in 
teaching rather than in some other occupation, the output foregone by having potentially 
productive workers in school rather than on the job, and, if the government’s budget is more or 
less fixed, the other government projects which must be foregone in order to provide students 
with financial aid. In contrast, the private costs to the student (and/or his family) include 
foregone earnings and out-of-pocket schooling costs. Social costs and private costs differ to the 
extent that (a) the general taxpayer subsidizes direct schooling costs, and (b) private foregone 
earnings differ from foregone aggregate production. 
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 A stream of benefits may be considered at one level from the viewpoint of additional 
income, either national income or personal disposable income. More generally, benefits may be 
viewed as increments to social welfare or personal utility, one component of which is income. 
The welfare-utility approach is conceptually more appealing, although it may be of little value 
operationally. 
 Social welfare is presumed to depend positively on the present value of aggregate output 
(net of education costs), the fraction of the labour force employed, the fraction of the labour 
force educated beyond a certain level, and equality of opportunity and income distribution. Of 
course, there is no consensus social welfare function; the weights assigned to different 
components vary from individual to individual and policy maker to policy maker. Personal utility 
is presumed to depend positively on the present value of net lifetime disposable income and the 
quality, status, and other non- pecuniary aspects of the job a person holds.15 Neglecting the 
problems of trying to specify the form of social welfare and personal utility functions, the social 
and private benefits of education differ to the extent that additions to private incomes diverge 
from the marginal productivity to society. 
 The marginal social return to education is the difference (or ratio) between the marginal 
social benefits and the marginal social costs if one more person is educated. Similarly, the 
marginal private return to an individual from additional education is the net increment to 
personal utility if he becomes educated. We note that the cost-benefit criterion is expressed in 
terms of marginal social returns, not private. 
 The composition and total magnitude of the returns to investment in education depend 
critically on the nature of the labour markets for educated persons. The cases of excess demand 
for and excess supply of educated persons will be considered in turn. 
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3. Returns to Education in Full Employment Economies 
 
 By way of contrast with labour surplus economies, let us briefly consider situations of 
full employment, which apply not only to full employment economies but also to occupations 
requiring either very high-level or very specific training in economies which otherwise have 
surplus labour. In cases where wages are flexible and adjust so as to achieve full employment or 
where wages are rigid but set below the market-clearing level so that demand for educated labour 
exceeds the supply, graduates can easily find a job utilizing their skills and can expect only brief 
periods of frictional unemployment. 
 When a person is educated for a full employment or excess demand occupation, at a 
minimum, society gains the value of his marginal product on his new job, which may be very 
large if the presence of an additional educated person helps to relieve a skilled labour bottleneck 
which had been retarding production. There may be shortages of less educated persons to fill the 
job he would have had, but a replacement is often available. Even if a replacement is not 
available, there will be higher output to the extent that the educated worker’s marginal product is 
higher on his new job than it would have been if he were not educated and worked in some 
lower-level job, and the output gains from relief of bottlenecks are still realized. Society benefits 
from higher output, additional employment, and a greater fraction of its labour force educated. 
Society incurs the costs enumerated in the previous section. 
 The educated person himself benefits from a higher-level job which generally offers 
higher pay, more stable employment, and superior working conditions and other non-pecuniary 
benefits.16 He may experience gains in utility from higher status or from a richer or more 
fulfilling life. Turning to the private costs, due to the abundance of job opportunities at most 
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educational levels in full employment economies, foregone earnings may be substantial. In 
addition, out-of-pocket costs may be very large, since students in full employment economies are 
often charged a large fraction of the costs of their education. While the benefits may be 
considerable, so also may be the costs, so that private rates of return, while positive, are not 
found to be particularly great. 
 Since there is virtually full employment of graduates, if wages reflect marginal 
productivity, the economic benefits to society and to the individual are similar.17 Furthermore, 
private costs and social costs are of the same order of magnitude. Thus, one would expect, as is 
indeed the case, the average social and private returns in full employment economies to be quite 
similar. 
 Since the newly-educated person in full employment economies becomes employed in a 
high-level job which utilizes his schooling and is paid about18 the same wage as those educated 
earlier, the marginal benefits are approximated by the averages. There is little reason to expect 
the marginal social cost to differ appreciably from the average. Thus, the conventional ‘social 
rate of return’ is a useful guide to educational decision-making in full employment economies. 
 We turn now to the case of labour surplus economies 
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4. Private Returns and the Demand for Education in Labour Surplus Economies 
 
Private Costs 
 
 The private costs of education in labour surplus economies are in many cases quite small. 
The earnings foregone by an individual depend not only upon the wage rate but also upon the 
probabilities of employment, underemployment, and unemployment. The younger the individual 
and the lower his educational attainment, the lower the wage and the likelihood of employment. 
In labour surplus economies, in which there are large numbers of unemployed and 
underemployed in search of work, the probability of employment for a school-aged person may 
be very low indeed. Hence, foregone earnings may be a small item to the individual. 
Furthermore, under existing institutional arrangements in many less developed countries, either 
the entire amount or a large fraction of the out-of-pocket costs of education are paid by the 
central government.19 The higher the education level, the more likely this is to be the case. The 
out-of-pocket costs of schooling may therefore be very small or, to the extent that students 
receive cash allowances, even negative. In sum, the private costs of education in labour surplus 
economies may amount to very little. 
 
Private Benefits 
 
 The private benefits from education in labour surplus economies may be very large. 
Percentage wage differentials between different skill levels in labour surplus economies, 
particularly those in Africa, are much greater than in full employment economies.20 Furthermore, 
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those with the most education, and those trained in specific excess-demand skills, experience 
much more stable employment than persons with less education. Expected lifetime income for 
university graduates may be several times as high as for secondary school leavers, who in turn 
may expect to earn several times as much as primary school leavers. These high private benefits, 
compared with the low private costs, lead to a very high rate of return for most educational 
investments.21 
 
The Demand for Education 
 
 Education is demanded by families who would like their children educated at a particular 
level. The demand for a given level of education may be presumed to depend on the average 
private22 rate of return to that level of education, which is greater 
(a) the higher the salaries and non-pecuniary benefits realized by persons with that level of 
education, 
(b) the lower the unemployment of persons with that level, 
(c) the lower the school fees at that level, 
(d) the lower the salaries and non-pecuniary benefits realized by persons with only the 
previous level of education, 
(e) the greater the unemployment of persons with only the previous level, 
(f) the greater the probability of admission to the next level of schooling, 
(g) the lower the school fees at the next level, 
(h) the higher the salaries and non-pecuniary benefits realized by persons with the next level 
of education, 
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(i) the lower the unemployment of persons with the next level. 
This demand for education is not expressed in textbook fashion whereby citizens demand 
different quantities in a marketplace at different prices. Rather, demand for education is 
manifested through the political process as citizens bring pressure to bear on government 
officials to increase the number of school spaces, not only at the given level but at prerequisite 
levels as well. 
 The demand for a given level of education also depends on capital market conditions. 
The policy of paying the full costs of higher levels of education for virtually everyone who can 
find spaces in the schools exchanges one imperfection for another, resulting in a very high 
private demand for education. The original imperfection was that capital markets did not operate 
sufficiently well to allow students from low-income families to borrow long-term funds to pay 
the short-term costs of their schooling in cases where the marginal private benefits exceeded the 
marginal private costs. This capital market imperfection seriously retarded private demand 
amongst the local population. Particularly in the newly independent countries of Africa, this 
situation was judged socially undesirable in view of the goal of equality of educational 
opportunity for citizens. The full-subsidy scheme introduced a new imperfection. Not only does 
it exclude the very real capital costs from the price of investing in human capital but it also 
excludes all out-of-pocket costs as well, which leads to a very high private rate of return. 
Without any constraints imposed by the necessity of financing educational investment by 
recourse to a capital market, the very high private rate of return is readily translated into a very 
high private demand for education which is much greater than it would have been under the 
original scheme. Enrolments are limited not by a private rate of return which bears any relation 
to the true social costs and benefits, or by unavailability of capital, but rather by the capacities of 
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the educational institutions. The likely consequences—dissatisfaction and political pressure to 
expand the educational system beyond a socially optimal size—may be more serious than the 
original state of affairs. 
 
The Effect of Increasing the Supply of Educational Spaces on the Demand for Education23 
 
 If the government bows to political pressure and decides to educate another person, what 
will happen to the demand for education? The result depends critically on the labour market 
behaviour of the educated and employers. Let us consider three alternative cases.24 
 
Case 1: Labour market stratification. 
 
 Suppose a person seeks to avoid a low-level job which he regards as ‘menial’ or ‘dirty’. 
He therefore desires to be educated in order to qualify for a high-level job for which there is 
already a surplus of qualified workers, even though he (and they) expect to be unemployed at 
least part of the time. From the point of view of an employer, education may make a person less 
desirable for a job. For instance, the morale of a secondary school graduate employed as a 
sweeper may be so low that an illiterate would be more productive. In such a situation, (1) 
highly-educated workers enter the market for skilled jobs only, (2) employers do not wish to hire 
highly educated workers for low-level jobs, (3) workers with little education are unqualified for 
high-level jobs, and (4) employers prefer to hire persons with low education for low-level jobs. 
The net effect of this situation is to entirely separate the high-skill and low-skill labour markets, 
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except that the acquisition of an education (or at least the certificate) is the means by which a 
person moves from one to the other. 
 Rigid wages were presumed initially to be the cause of unemployment. If workers at each 
level are employed until the marginal product of the last worker hired equals the wage rate, 
employment is determined, which then determines output. If another person is educated, he 
enters the skilled labour force, thereby reducing the expected probability of finding a job and 
reducing expected life-time income for skilled workers. Simultaneously, the expected probability 
of finding an unskilled job is increased, since there is one fewer job seeker, which raises the 
expected lifetime income of unskilled workers. The difference (or ratio) between expected 
lifetime income for skilled and unskilled workers is reduced. Since demand for education 
depends positively on the expected lifetime income differential, which is now smaller, an 
increase in the supply of education would cause there to be less demand for education. 
 
Case 2: ‘Pure bumping’. 
 
 In contrast to the labour market stratification case, let us suppose that young people 
demand education on the margin specifically in order to stand a better chance of being hired for 
low-level jobs and that employers prefer to hire persons with more education at the prevailing 
wage rate, either because they are (or are believed to be) more productive or simply because 
employers prefer to associate with the better educated. For whatever reason it occurs, preferential 
hiring by educational level will lead to the general upgrading of hiring standards, and of the 
labour force in general, so long as the educational system produces more graduates than are 
needed to fill skilled positions and some of them are willing to seek employment at a lower level. 
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 As in the labour market stratification case, since wages are rigid, if productivity effects 
are neglected, employment and output are determined. Ordinarily there will be fewer educated 
persons seeking unskilled jobs than the number of unskilled jobs available. If the government 
now decides to educate another person, due to preferential hiring, the educated person moves to 
the front of the queue for unskilled jobs and is hired first at the unskilled wage rate, ‘bumping’ a 
less-educated person from a job. This lowers the probability of getting an unskilled job and also 
lowers the present value of expected lifetime income for the unskilled. Since there are still the 
same number of educated workers looking for the same number of high-level jobs in the skilled 
labour market, the expected lifetime income for persons in the skilled labour market is 
unchanged. The difference (or ratio) between expected lifetime income for educated and 
uneducated workers is increased, resulting in a greater demand for education and even more 
political pressure. 
 
Case 3: ‘Modified bumping’25 
 
 As an alternative to the ‘pure bumping’ case, it is noted that school leavers probably do 
not automatically disqualify themselves from the market for high-level jobs. Rather, they first 
look for high-level jobs, the unsuccessful get discouraged, and then ‘bump’ the less educated out 
of lower-level jobs.26 In this case, an increase in the supply of education does not lead to an 
unambiguous prediction concerning the effect on demand.27 
 As before, employment and output are determined. If another person is educated, there 
are now more seekers for high-level jobs. This lowers the probability of finding high-level 
employment, thereby lowering the present value of expected lifetime income for the educated. 
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However, since the unsuccessful will, after a time, accept lower-level employment, the 
probability of a less educated person finding a job is reduced, which lowers the present value of 
expected lifetime income for the uneducated. Since both expected income streams fall, one 
cannot determine a priori whether the private rate of return to education, and hence demand, goes 
up or down. The direction of change depends on such factors as the number and skill distribution 
of job openings, the number of educated job seekers relative to the total number of new jobs, the 
wage structure, and schooling costs. In any event, we would expect this ‘modified bumping’ 
process to lead to the same kind of gradual upgrading of hiring standards as in the ‘pure 
bumping’ case. 
 The two bumping cases suggest the possibility that the private demand for education at 
all levels can constantly increase at the same time as employment prospects for those with a 
given educational attainment continually worsen. This process could continue indefinitely as 
people seek to be relatively the best educated. 
 In my judgement,28 this chain of events is the major historical explanation of the growth 
of primary and secondary, and even to some extent, university education, in developed 
economies. It would explain such seemingly unnecessarily high educational requirements as a 
secondary school diploma to work on the automobile assembly line in Detroit, a university 
degree to work as a bank teller, and a post-graduate degree to teach primary school in New York 
City. Furthermore, if central governments only partially satisfy the demand, the disequilibrium 
will be resolved as citizens get together and construct their own community schools. This 
process, I believe, explains Kenya’s post-independence growth of Harambee (self-help) 
community secondary schools, the simultaneous worsening of job prospects for secondary school 
leavers, and the persistence of high demand for education. 
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5. Social Returns to Education in Labour Surplus Economies 
 
 In labour surplus economies, the marginal social rate of return to education for labour 
surplus occupations might be very small or even negative. This is because the marginal social 
costs (in real terms) are positive and very possibly large and the marginal social benefits are 
positive and often quite small. Let us consider the social costs and benefits in some detail. 
 
Social Costs 
 
 In labour surplus economies, the social costs of education may be very much higher than 
the private costs. Typically, labour surplus economies have a large and perhaps redundant supply 
of unskilled and uneducated labour, with severe shortages of both physical and human capital. 
The educational system is a large user of both human and non-human capital. A glance at the 
capital budgets, wage bills of teachers, and number of teacher training spaces relative to 
education for other occupations, confirms this view.29 Thus, the resources devoted to education 
in labour surplus economies are extremely valuable in the light of the important alternative uses 
to which they could be put. 
 There is an important counter-argument to the view that the educational system is a large 
user of capital with valuable alternative uses. With respect to human capital, in some countries 
many teachers are themselves only generally educated secondary school graduates of whom 
there is a surplus.30 If these persons were to enter the non-education labour market, they might 
find that they would fare no better than other secondary school leavers. Perhaps the low salary 
level of teachers as compared with those of other white-collar professionals is primarily a 
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reflection of low opportunity productivity. With respect to physical capital, the resources used to 
construct schools might simply not be supplied otherwise. To the extent that labour is specially 
volunteered and physical materials are gathered or made, the real resource cost of educational 
expansion may be quite small. 
 Another substantial component of the social costs of education is the financial aid granted 
to students. In many less developed countries, students in secondary and post-secondary 
education pay none or only a small fraction of the costs of their education, receive housing and 
other payments in kind, and in addition may receive a small cash living allowance. If the 
government’s budget is relatively flexible, this is merely a transfer from taxpayers to students to 
enable them to pay the costs of their schooling. But if the government’s budget is more or less 
fixed, the value of the financial aid is represented in real terms by the social welfare which would 
be realized if the money were used on the next best projects. 
 In contrast to full employment economies, the output foregone by having potentially 
productive workers in school in labour surplus economies is minimal. By the definition of a 
labour surplus economy, there are large numbers of unskilled workers. To the extent that 
uneducated persons are temporarily withdrawn from the labour force while in school, there are 
plenty of others to fill the jobs they would have held. There would be a loss of output only to the 
extent that the persons selected for further education are more productive on the job than those 
who replace them. 
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Social Benefits 
 
 Suppose that in a labour surplus economy, society educates another person and the 
educated person uses his newly-acquired skills to fill a high- level job which would otherwise 
have been vacant. This is equivalent analytically to the labour shortage case described in Section 
3, and society gains all the benefits enumerated therein. 
 Suppose instead that an additional person is educated at a level which only qualifies him 
for jobs for which other persons are already queueing. To give a concrete example, suppose there 
are two kinds of jobs, clerks and gardeners. Secondary education is required to be a clerk. No 
education is required for gardeners. Let us assume for the moment that the provision of education 
is costless in both real and budgetary terms to the country in question.31 (We will relax this 
assumption shortly.) What are the benefits to society of having one more educated person? 
 
Labour Market Stratification 
 
 If the graduate enters the labour force for clerks (the labour market stratification case of 
Section 4) and the wage rate for clerks is fixed at level Wc
* above the market-clearing wage, 
employment of clerks is unchanged at equilibrium level E*, since demand curve D (the marginal 
product of labour curve) does not shift. (See Figure 1.) Whether this particular worker is hired, or 
some other secondary leaver is hired, society gains no additional output. The marginal social rate 
of return to investment in education in output terms is therefore negative in this case. 
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Bumping 
 
 Suppose instead that the marginal graduate enters the labour force for a less skilled 
occupation, in this case gardening; or equivalently, his presence in the labour force for clerks 
induces some other person in that labour force to seek a job as a gardener instead. Then the 
situation is as in Figures 2 through 4. Unemployment among clerks is the same as it was 
previously, since supply and demand in that labour market are unchanged (Figure 2). Figures 3 
and 4 illustrate the labour market for gardeners. The original supplies of educated and 
uneducated gardeners are represented by 𝑆𝑜 in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The 𝐷𝑜’s are the 
demand curves, Eo
*’s the initial equilibria, and Wg
* the common rigid wage rates. Since by 
assumption educated gardeners are hired first and demand exceeds supply, all educated 
gardeners are employed. The presence of an additional supply of educated gardeners (shift of 
supply curve to 𝑆1 in Figure 3) will increase employment of educated gardeners by the same 
amount. The greater availability and employment of educated gardeners will lead to the 
displacement of uneducated gardeners, either immediately by firing, or over time by replacement 
of retirees. If the level of employment of educated gardeners has no effect on the productivity of 
uneducated gardeners, the demand curve for uneducated gardeners will shift from 𝐷𝑜 to 𝐷1, the 
leftward shift of the demand curve for uneducated gardeners equalling the rightward shift in the 
supply of educated gardeners. Hence, total employment of gardeners would be unchanged. To 
the extent that educated gardeners are more productive than uneducated ones, output is 
increased. 
 If the presence of additional, highly productive educated gardeners raises the productivity 
of the uneducated gardeners, the shift of the demand curve for uneducated gardeners will be to 
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some intermediate position such as 𝐷1’ in Figure 4. In this case there will be an increase in total 
employment of gardeners with subsequently greater output. The greater the productivity of 
educated workers relative to uneducated and the stronger the positive effects of employment of 
educated workers on the productivity of uneducated workers, the greater the output effects of 
educating more persons. 
 The productivity gains realized from a better-educated work force may be very small in 
many areas of the modern sector. Literacy may do little to raise the productivity of domestics, 
gardeners, and the like. General secondary education may do little for such persons as bus 
drivers, repairmen, and craftsmen. Society gains little additional output by educating the labour 
force at such levels. However, this is not always the case. In the crucial agricultural sector, there 
is some evidence to suggest that secondary, or even primary, education raises the output of 
farmers by improving organizational ability, facilitating optimal choices of crops and inputs, and 
making the farmer more receptive to innovations, information, and expert assistance.32 To the 
extent that this is the case, the output effects may be considerable. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
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Insert Figure 4 Here 
 
 
 Another possible source of productivity gains relates to the educational system as a 
means of discovering outstanding young people to become future national leaders. This 
argument has long been recognized by economists. As Marshall wrote: 
‘We may then conclude that the wisdom of expending public and private funds is not to 
be measured by its direct fruits alone. It will be profitable as a mere investment to give 
the masses of the people much greater opportunities and to get the start needed for 
bringing out their latent abilities. And the economic value of one industrial genius is 
sufficient to cover the expenses of a whole town.’33 
 
 I believe this argument has some merit. However, the number of budding young 
industrial geniuses is probably not very large. It is doubtful that poor countries can afford the 
large outlays required for the probably small and definitely uncertain benefits. 
 When costs of supplying education are introduced, it is questionable whether the positive 
output effects resulting from productivity gains exceed the negative output effects of using 
scarce physical and human capital to produce education. Although more teachers will be 
employed, employment in the output-producing sector would fall. This is because each unit of 
labour has less capital to work with and would be illustrated by leftward shifts of the demand for 
labour curves in Figures 2 through 4. Aggregate employment might well fall. There is 
presumably some social benefit from the fact that a larger fraction of the labour force is 
educated. However, there would be an adverse effect on income distribution (and thus a 
presumed negative social benefit) if the educated person comes from a well- to-do family and 
educational expansion is financed by a regressive tax structure. So all in all, there might be little 
if any social benefit from educating another person. The marginal social rate of return to 
investment in education might be negative in many labour surplus economies. 
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6. An Example of the Measurement of Rates of Return to Education in Labour Surplus 
Economies 
 
 The difficulty of computing a marginal social rate of return in labour surplus economies 
results from stringent data requirements. An aggregate production function and demand for 
labour functions by educational category are required in order to estimate additional and 
foregone output. These need to be expressed in the context of expected growth of the economy, 
which necessitates estimates of technical change and demographic trends. Few labour surplus 
economies have the required data. However, a static approximation, which only requires point 
estimates of marginal rates of substitution between one type of labour and another and between 
labour and capital, might prove feasible. 
 Traditionally, observed earnings differentials have been used to measure the output 
effects on society of additional education. However, a crucial and generally neglected point is: in 
labour surplus economies, wage differentials are an inadequate measure of social productivity 
gains, even if employed workers are paid the value of their marginal products by their 
employers. As a result, the average social rate of return as conventionally calculated may be a 
completely misleading guide to social decision making on educational investments. 
 For illustrative purposes, let us consider the following hypothetical data under the 
assumptions of the ‘modified bumping’ case of Section 4. Suppose the state of the economy is: 
Wage of clerks (shs/day) 20 
Employment of clerks 50 
Supply of clerks 100 
Wage of gardeners (shs/day) 10 
Total employment of gardeners 40 
Supply of educated gardeners 25 
Employment of uneducated gardeners 15 
Supply of uneducated gardeners 75 
Private and Social Returns        24 
Let us now use these data to illustrate some important points. 
 
Allocation of Educated Workers to Different Labour Markets 
 
 It may be hypothesized that educated workers allocate themselves among labour markets 
so that the mathematical expectations of the wages in the respective labour markets (wage times 
number of jobs divided by labour force) are equal. In our example, an educated person would 
expect to earn 10 shs/day either as a clerk or as an educated gardener (20 ×
50
100
= 10 ×
25
25
). In 
the absence of systematic non-pecuniary preferences for one occupation or the other, or for 
certainty in preference to uncertainty (or vice versa), equality of expected wages is an 
equilibrium condition. For instance, suppose ten more persons are educated. If any of these 
persons enters the labour market for clerks, the expected wage for clerks (20 ×
50
100+𝑛
 where n = the number who enter the labour market for clerks) would be less than for 
educated gardeners. The labour market for educated persons would be in disequilibrium, which 
would be resolved only if ten educated persons enter the labour market for gardeners.34 
 
The Appropriate Wage Ratio for the Private Rate of Return 
 
 The expected wage for uneducated persons is the uneducated wage times the probability 
of an uneducated person being employed: 10 ×
15
75
= 2. The educated-uneducated expected wage 
ratio is therefore 
10
5
= 5. This expected wage ratio, along with private costs, determines the 
private rate of return and the private demand for education. When there is unemployment, the 
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relevant wage ratio is not the wage ratio for employed clerks compared to employed gardeners 
(20/10). Neither is the correct ratio the wage of the average employed educated person 
(20 ×
50
75
+ 10 ×
25
75
= 16
3
2
) compared to the average employed uneducated person (10).35 
 The average private rate of return is that internal rate of return which equates the stream 
of discounted expected educated-uneducated wage differentials to the private costs of schooling. 
To calculate the average private rate of return in our hypothetical economy, let us assume: 
(i) the current expected income differential (8 shs/day=2,000 shs/year) is expected to prevail 
forever, 
(ii) (ii) education takes one period, and 
(iii) the private costs of being educated (out-of-pocket cost plus foregone earnings) is shs 
1,000. 
 Then the average private rate of return is given implicitly by 2,000 (
1
1+𝑟
+
1
(1+𝑟)2
+ ⋯ +
1
(1+𝑟)𝑇
) = 1,000, where T is the relevant time horizon, presumably retirement. For sufficiently 
large T, the left hand side is approximately 
2,000
𝑟
. 
 Substituting and solving for r, we find an average private rate of return of 200 per cent. 
From the individual’s point of view, it would be an understatement to say that education would 
be a very lucrative personal investment. 
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Measurement of Social Productivity 
 
 If we take the stream of expected educated-uneducated wage differentials projected over 
time compared to the current average cost of educating one more person, the average internal 
rate of return which equates the two streams is what is commonly called ‘the social rate of 
return’. Under assumptions (i), (ii), and (iv) the social cost of educating one person is shs 10,000, 
the average social rate of return is given implicitly by 
2,000 (
1
1 + 𝑟
+
1
(1 + 𝑟)2
+ ⋯ +
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
) = 10,000 
and is found to be 20 per cent. By the conventional calculations, educational investment would 
appear desirable. 
 The internal rate of return which equates the marginal social benefits to the marginal 
social costs is ‘the marginal social rate of return’. This rate may be large, small, zero, or 
negative, depending on the size of the productivity gains resulting from education. Nothing in the 
data we have so far tells us which is the case. We simply cannot infer whether investment in 
education is a good investment or not. 
 If educated gardeners are only slightly more productive than uneducated ones, the 
marginal social rate of return is small or even negative and the investment would be undesirable. 
Suppose in our example, (v) an educated gardener is 2 per cent more productive than an 
uneducated one. 
The marginal social rate of return is given implicitly by 
50 (
1
1+𝑟
+
1
(1+𝑟)2
+ ⋯ +
1
(1+𝑟)𝑇
) = 10,000, the solution of which gives a marginal social rate of 
return of one-half of one percent.36 Although the average private and social rates of return (200 
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per cent and 20 per cent respectively) are very high, we would all agree that educational 
investment would be undesirable. 
 Care must be exercised in using average private and social rates of return. The private 
rate of return is an important index of the strength of the private demand and political pressure 
for educational expansion. The average social rate of return gives us an upper limit on the 
marginal rate. An average social rate of return which is below the rates which could be earned on 
other social projects is a clear indication that the educational investment is not desirable on 
economic grounds, but a higher rate is of little help. As a guide to decision-making for 
educational planners, the average private and social rates of return neither ask the right questions 
nor measure the right phenomena. 
 To the best of my knowledge, only one empirical cost-benefit study calculates a marginal 
social rate of return. Using shadow wage rates obtained by solving the dual of a linear 
programming model for Greece, Psacharopoulos37 estimated marginal social rates of return to 
investment in education. For our purposes, the most interesting conclusion is; ‘In the case of 
Greece, investment priorities with respect to investment in skills estimated on the basis of 
observed labour earnings would have suggested a change in the wrong direction of the 
educational output.’ (Emphasis added.) 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 Let us conclude by summarizing some of the main points raised in the paper. The 
intention of this paper was to consider a specific criterion for decision on educational 
investments, the benefit-cost criterion, which evaluates marginal social costs and benefits. Some 
educational planners and advisers unfortunately fail to distinguish marginal from average returns 
or private returns from social ones. 
 The composition and magnitude of the private and social returns to education depend 
largely on the nature of the labour markets for educated persons. More specifically, if a person is 
educated for an excess demand occupation, the marginal social rate of return is approximated by 
the average social rate of return as conventionally measured. In contrast, education in labour 
surplus economies may confer a very high private rate of return on the educated person while at 
the same time the average social rate is high and the marginal social rate is small or negative. 
This would be the case unless bumping is accompanied by large productivity gains attributable to 
increased education. Furthermore, if bumping is prevalent, the private rate of return to education 
may actually rise if more education is supplied. Disequilibrium in the political market place for 
education might never be resolved unless education is offered to almost everyone. 
 Observed earnings differentials are a very poor approximation to the output gains to 
society from additional education in labour surplus economies. For such countries, the average 
social rate of return may convey a grossly distorted impression about the desirability of an 
educational investment. While few labour surplus economies at present have the data needed to 
accurately compute a marginal social rate of return, the data might be sufficient to permit point 
estimates of the relevant parameters in order to construct a first approximation. 
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